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The aim of this study was to introduce a modified version of the covariation detection task to the 
meta-reasoning framework. This task has been used to assess scientific reasoning through the 
evaluation of fictitious experiment outcomes and hypothesis testing. The traditional covariation 
detection task was modified to include only the magnitude versus ratio-bias. The participants' task 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of an experimental manipulation in a series of fictitious 
experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 61) consisted of twenty covariation detection tasks. In half of the 
tasks, normative and heuristic responses were congruent, and for the other half they were 
incongruent. Experiment 2 (N = 48) had the same experimental design, however, the fictitious data 
was modified to increase the relative strength of the normative response. After each trial participants 
provided a judgment of confidence. Results confirmed that the main manipulation of congruence 
was successful. Participants were more accurate, faster and more confident in the congruent 
condition. The manipulation from Experiment 2 had a larger impact on response times than on 
confidence judgments and accuracy. Correct responses were faster in Experiment 2 when compared 
to Experiment 1, with higher confidence for correct congruent responses. Analyses by response type 
revealed large individual differences in the relative strength of the processes which generate 
normative and biased responses. Participants were faster and more confident when rationalizing in 
favour of their dominant response while they were slower and less confident when decoupling from 
that dominant response. The covariation detection task provides new valuable insight into meta-
reasoning processes. 
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The dual-process approach to thinking assumes that there are two distinct 
categories of processes which lead human reasoning. Traditionally, Type 1 processes 
have been described as fast, intuitive, based on heuristics and with low cognitive 
resource requirements. On the other hand, Type 2 processes have been described as 
slow, analytic, deliberate and cognitively costly. Decades of research have revealed 
that only the difference in cognitive load remains as a defining feature, while the 
others are more appropriately viewed as correlates (for an excellent review see Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). Modern dual-process models assume that multiple Type 1 
processes generate responses during reasoning. These processes may, or may not, 
generate the same response. A congruent situation is observable when multiple 
processes generate the same response and an incongruent situation when they 
generate different responses. The strength of the processes, and thus, the generated 
responses are not necessarily equal which leads to a relative dominance of one 
process over the other. If the generated responses are different, then there is the 
possibility that a conflict between them may be detected. The detection of conflict is 
presumed to be one of the major triggers for initiation of Type 2 processes. The 
resolution of this conflict represents Type 2 processing. The conflict may be resolved 
in one of two ways. First, the dominant response may be chosen as the final response 
regardless of the conflict. This process is defined as rationalization (Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Wason & Evans, 1975). Second, the alternative 
response may be chosen as the final response after cognitive dis-attachment from the 
dominant initial response. This process is defined as cognitive decoupling 
(Pennycook et al., 2015; Stanovich, 2009a). Additionally, if none of the initial 
responses are deemed appropriate, further processing is required to generate more 
responses (processing traditionally labelled as analytical thinking). For a detailed 
review of the current state of the dual-process approach, see De Neys (2018).  
During the past couple of decades, there has been an increasing interest in 
expanding and supplementing reasoning research by investigating the accompanying 
metacognitive processes. For this purpose, the framework of meta-reasoning has 
been developing and growing in significance within the reasoning community. The 
goal of meta-reasoning research is to provide insight into control and monitoring 
metacognitive processes and their relationship with reasoning (Ackerman & 
Thompson, 2015, 2017). Meta-reasoning has been developed following the tradition 
of meta-memory research (Nelson & Narens, 1990), and adopts some of the 
measures from that tradition. A number of metacognitive indicators may be 
measured before (e.g. judgment of solvability), during (e.g. feeling of rightness) or 
after reasoning processes have been completed (e.g. final judgment of confidence). 
One of the main findings from meta-reasoning research has shown that participants 
rarely have insight into normative accuracy when generating confidence judgments 
(Bajšanski, Močibob, & Valerjev, 2014; Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011; Valerjev & 
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Dujmović, 2017). More salient indicators have been shown to better predict 
metacognitive judgments. Response times, which provide a measure of response 
fluency, are a robust predictor of metacognitive judgments (Ackerman & Zalmanov, 
2012; Thompson, Evans, & Campbell, 2013; Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 2013). 
Our recent work has shown that conflict detection and resolution have an impact on 
the formation of metacognitive judgments, such as the confidence judgment, 
independently of fluency (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018). Furthermore, lower 
confidence and feeling of rightness are correlated with the probability of rethinking 
initial answers in reasoning tasks (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006; Thompson & 
Johnson, 2014; Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 2013). Finally, more emerging 
evidence points towards large individual differences in sensitivity to conflict 
(Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Frey, Johnson, & De Neys, 2018; Mevel et al., 2015). 
These findings have proven valuable for developing reasoning models, especially 
within the dual-process approach, and in understanding the relationship between 
reasoning and metacognitive processes.  
Meta-reasoning research has mostly relied on tasks which are based on 
processes which may produce conflicting responses based on the experimental 
manipulation. In incongruent (conflict) versions, these tasks, most commonly, have 
two dominant responses one of which is based on a cognitive heuristic, while the 
other is traditionally considered analytical. It is worth noting that modern models of 
dual processing propose that, what was traditionally considered an analytical 
response, may rather be viewed as a different type of heuristic. For example, 
researchers speculate on the existence of logical intuitions (De Neys, 2012, 2014) 
which provide logically correct responses as fast as belief bias. Some of the common 
tasks are categorical syllogisms (Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Thompson & 
Morsanyi, 2012), conditional reasoning (Markovits, Thompson, & Brisson, 2015), 
the base rate neglect task (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; 
Pennycook et al., 2015), items from the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) (Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2014), the Linda problem (Aczel, Szollosi, & Bago, 2016), the 
denominator neglect task (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Thompson & Johnson, 
2014), moral reasoning tasks (Bialek & De Neys, 2016), and causal reasoning tasks 
(Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). Many of the results 
in these studies point towards convergent conclusions, but it is important to continue 
investigating new tasks within the meta-reasoning approach for a number of reasons. 
First, the cognitive bias which is conflicted with normatively correct thinking can 
vary depending on the task. This means that investigating new tasks and biases 
provides valuable information about the underlying cognitive mechanisms. 
Additionally, converging evidence connects traditionally separated domains of 
reasoning such as inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, 
moral reasoning and others. Second, it is difficult to find a fine balance between 
methodological control, experimental manipulation and ecological validity. For 
example, the commonly used version of the base rate neglect task (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008) formally does not have a normatively correct response. Formal 
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logic, on the other hand, has a normatively correct response, but seems artificial to 
participants. Tasks such as the Linda problem rely on the conjunction rule which is 
rather difficult to grasp. Third, in most of these tasks the dominant Type 1 response 
is far more dominant than the alternative (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Pennycook 
et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 2013). This 
means that experimental manipulations have to be implemented in an extreme form 
in order to overcome this gap and may not provide enough in-depth insight into the 
process which generates the alternative response. It also makes it more difficult to 
examine the sensitivity to the conflict between the two responses when it is present. 
The reasoning literature has an abundance of tasks which have traditionally 
been used to investigate human rationality. These tasks cover a variety of different 
areas of reasoning. Scientific reasoning includes the evaluation of evidence, 
hypothesis formation and testing, evaluating causal relationships etc. (Stanovich, 
2009b). These skills are used in everyday thinking as well as in a number of 
laboratory experiments. Some of the tasks which employ scientific reasoning are the 
Wason selection task, the covariation detection task, causal reasoning tasks and 
various probabilistic reasoning tasks. The covariation detection task has been 
described as an exemplary task concerned with scientific reasoning (Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2016). Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2011) investigated the 
relationship between the CRT and what they labelled as heuristics-and-biases tasks. 
The covariation detection task which has been adopted for the current study was one 
of those tasks. The original task was described as shown below. 
A doctor had been working on a cure for a mysterious disease. Finally, he 
created a drug that he thinks will cure people of the disease. Before he can begin to 
use it regularly, he has to test the drug. He selected 300 people who had the disease 
and gave them the drug to see what happened. He selected 100 people who had the 
disease and did not give them the drug in order to see what happened. The table 
below indicates what the outcome of the experiment was: 
 
 Cure 
 Yes No 
Treatment present 200 100 
Treatment absent 75 25 
 
Participants were asked to judge whether this treatment was positively or 
negatively associated with the cure for this disease by circling a number from a scale 
ranging from -10 (strong negative association) to +10 (strong positive association). 
Negative judgments, which indicated the inefficacy of the treatment, were scored as 
correct. 
This task presents participants with a simple fictitious experiment and asks them 
to evaluate the results. Early research in covariation tasks was concerned with how 
people process covariations and how they valued information based on spatial layout 
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of the data rather than researching biases in reasoning (Kao & Wasserman, 1993; 
Wasserman, Dorner, & Kao, 1990). Later, Stanovich, and West (1998a, 1998b) 
introduced a belief bias component to the task. As can be seen in the example above, 
belief in the effectiveness of a cure compared to a placebo needs to be ignored in 
order to recognize that the cure was inefficient (Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999). The 
ratio of positive to negative outcomes is higher in the treatment-absent condition 
when compared to the treatment condition. The task requires decontextualization in 
order to be solved correctly. While studying this problem we noticed a more basic 
principle which may be the main source of bias in the specific example above. The 
principle seems to have the same underlying mechanism as shown in the ratio bias 
(Miller, Turnbull, & McFarland, 1989) and denominator neglect (Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992) tasks. Concrete frequencies are more salient and processed more 
quickly than ratios which leads to a bias towards the higher frequency of positive 
outcomes in the treatment when compared to the treatment-absent condition. 
Additionally, the difference between the positive and negative outcomes in the 
treatment condition is larger when compared to the treatment-absent condition. It is 
worth noting that a similar tradition of research has focused on the formation of 
illusory correlations from experience of event frequencies. In this tradition 
participants implicitly form correlations between events or characteristics which both 
occur with a high or both with a low frequency even though they do not have all of 
the information necessary to asses the true relationship between the variables in 
question (Fiedler, Kutzner, & Vogel, 2013; Mullen & Johnson, 1990). 
 
Overview of the Experiments 
 
We decided to adapt the task by eliminating the belief bias component and 
manipulating only the magnitude-versus-ratio conflict. Belief bias was eliminated by 
producing content in which prior knowledge and experience were not in favour of 
either option. The main experimental manipulation (the conflict of magnitude versus 
ratios) was achieved by generating specific sets of frequencies and ratios for our tasks 
(the process is explained in detail in the Appendix A. With such manipulation, we 
believe three desired outcomes were achieved. First, the task has a normatively 
correct, and a biased response which may or may not be in conflict depending on the 
experimental condition. Second, we expected that adjusting the ratios and 
frequencies provides an opportunity to achieve different levels of conflict. Third, the 
task achieves higher levels of ecological validity when compared to many other 
reasoning tasks. Daily life often requires the evaluation of outcomes based on 
empirical data. 
The general goal of this study was to investigate the modified covariation 
detection task using the rapid response paradigm within the meta-reasoning 
framework. This task, as far as we know, has not been researched within the meta-
reasoning framework using this paradigm. The specific goal of Experiment 1 was to 
confirm that conflict can be successfully manipulated and to determine the effects of 
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this conflict on accuracy, response times and confidence judgments. Experiment 2 
was designed to induce a different level of conflict when compared to Experiment 1 
by increasing the ratio of positive to negative outcomes for the correct responses. 
Additionally, the second experiment was intended as a partial replication of 
Experiment 1 on an independent sample. We expected that participants would be 
more accurate, faster and more confident in the congruent trials and that these 







Participants for both experiments were recruited among undergraduate 
psychology students unfamiliar with the task. A total of 109 participants volunteered 




The materials for this study were carefully constructed using the following 
procedure.  
Twenty imaginary scenarios which describe a change in a number of different 
fields were generated. These included new products, production processes, 
treatments, marketing campaigns etc. Alongside the description of what was 
introduced, additional information was provided on what was measured in order to 
judge the success of the innovation. For each scenario, a table of data was presented 
indicating the efficiency of two options (for example, the new and old techniques). 
An example of a scenario and data matrix can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of the data covariation scenario and data matrix. 
 
The example is incongruent because the correct option (the new technique) is 
accompanied by a smaller number of successful fertilizations and the difference 
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between successful and unsuccessful fertilizations is smaller when compared to the 
old technique. However, the new technique is more efficient (a better ratio between 
successful and unsuccessful fertilizations) and is thus the correct option. A congruent 
version of this example would assign both a high frequency and high ratio 
(efficiency) to the same option. Frequencies were generated based on an algorithm 
which can be found in Appendix A, which resulted in a 3 to 1 ratio of positive when 
compared to negative outcomes for the correct option, and a 2 to 1 ratio for negative 
outcomes. The final sets of frequencies were randomly assigned to the twenty 
scenarios. Finally, in half of the scenarios, both for the congruent and incongruent 
trials, the change was the correct option, and for the other half it was the incorrect 
one. It is also important to note that the contents of the scenarios were generated in a 
way to avoid possible belief bias effects due to prior experience. This was done by 
not using concrete names of products and processes described in the scenarios as well 
as picking contexts in which there was no reason to believe the introduced novelty 
would necessarily lead to an improvement. 
For Experiment 2, the only change was the increase of higher ratios in order to 
achieve an average of 8 to 1. This was achieved by adjusting the negative outcome 
frequencies for the correct options in Experiment 1. For example, the number of 




Both experiments were conducted using E-Prime v2.10.356. Each trial started 
with a fixation cross which lasted 1000 milliseconds. The fixation cross was followed 
by the scenario. Participants were told to press a key on the keyboard after they 
carefully read the scenario. After a key was pressed a table similar to the one in Figure 
1 appeared. Participants were instructed to analyse the data provided in the table and 
decide, as fast as possible, whether the change was better than the old/control option. 
Responses were made by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard (the "s" key 
was labelled as NO, and the "k" key as YES). Responses and response times were 
recorded. After each response, the participants were asked to provide a confidence 
judgment on a six point scale, ranging from 50% (guessing) to 100% (complete 
confidence), with 10% increments. 
Participants completed a single practice trial before the main measurement. The 
order of the main trials was randomized for each participant. Further, the position of 
positive and negative outcomes in the data tables was rotated to avoid bias towards 
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Even though the study describes two distinct experiments conducted at different 
times on independent samples, the data will be analysed in a single section for brevity 
and in order to make it easier to compare differences between the two experiments. 
 
Total Data Set Analysis 
 
Mean response times for congruent and incongruent conditions were calculated 
from median values from each participant. Mean confidence judgments were 
calculated from means for each participant. Finally, mean accuracy was calculated 
from the percentage of correct responses of each participant. The means and standard 
deviations from the total data set can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Mean (Standard Deviations) of Response Times, Confidence Judgments and Accuracy as a 
Function of Congruence in Experiments 1 and 2 
 Response times [ms] Confidence [%] Accuracy [%] 
Experiment 1    
Congruent 9703.88  (4246.47) 83.21    (8.18) 92.13  (12.26) 
Incongruent 11646.03  (5276.12) 78.07  (10.03) 57.38  (30.16) 
Experiment 2    
Congruent 7292.94  (2785.43) 88.32    (7.87) 96.78    (7.21) 
Incongruent 10037.78  (3647.91) 79.58    (7.77) 62.92  (31.75) 
 
In order to determine the effects of congruence and ratio extremity 
(experiment), 2(experiment) × 2(congruence) mixed ANOVAs were conducted on 
response times and confidence judgments. For accuracy, nonparametric tests were 
used since the distributions of accuracy data deviated significantly from normal. 
Results of the ANOVAs can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
ANOVA Results for Response Times and Confidence Judgments 
 Response times Confidence judgments 
 F(1, 107) ηp2 F(1, 107) ηp2 
Experiment 6.97** .06 4.50* .04 
Congruence 76.44** .42 157.64** .60 
Interaction 2.24 .02 10.55** .09 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
For both response times and confidence, we found a large effect of congruence. 
Participants were faster and more confident for responses in congruent when 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TOPICS, 28 (2019), 1, 93-113 
 
101 
compared to incongruent trials. A smaller main effect of experiment (ratio extremity) 
was also significant. Participants were slightly faster and more confident in 
Experiment 2 when compared to Experiment 1. However, for confidence judgments 
an interaction effect was significant due to the fact the only significant difference 
between the experiments was for congruent, but not for incongruent trials. 
In order to determine the difference in accuracy depending on congruence, a 
Wilcoxon matched pairs test was conducted. The result showed participants were 
significantly more accurate in congruent when compared to the incongruent trials (T 
= 85.00, Z = 8.05, p < .01). Man-Whitney U tests were conducted to determine 
possible differences between the two experiments (all U > 1161, all Z < 1.84, p > 
.05). Results showed there were no significant differences between the two 
experiments for both congruent and incongruent trials. 
 
Analysis by Response Type 
 
Further analyses were conducted in order to determine the effect of response 
type on response times and confidence judgments. For both experiments, mean 
response times and confidence judgments were calculated for correct congruent, 
correct incongruent and incorrect incongruent responses and analysed by conducting 
2×3 mixed ANOVAs. Incorrect responses in the congruent version of the task are 
not cued by the hypothesized heuristic or by deliberate reasoning about proportions 
so it can be attributed to either response errors or processes not predicted by the 
design, so they are excluded from these analyses. Results of these analyses can be 
seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
ANOVA Results for Response Times and Confidence Judgments Depending on the Response 
Type (Correct Congruent, Correct Incongruent and Incorrect Incongruent) 
 Response times Confidence judgments 
 F(df1, df2) ηp2 F(df1, df2) ηp2 
Experiment 3.02      (1,   86) .03 3.59       (1,   86) .04 
Response type 26.96
**   (2, 172) .24 66.05
**    (2, 172) .43 
Interaction 1.41      (2, 172) .02 3.41
*      (2, 172) .04 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Only the main effect of response type was significant for response times. Post-
hoc analysis (Tukey HSD) showed that correct responses in the congruent trials (M 
= 8622 ms, SD = 3859) were faster when compared to both correct (M = 11839 ms, 
SD = 4380) and incorrect (M = 12267 ms, SD = 7777) responses for incongruent 
trials. The difference between the two types of responses in the incongruent condition 
was not significant. While the main effect of the experiment was marginal (p = .09) 
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and the interaction effect was not significant, the pattern of results is interesting as 
can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Response times as a function of response type in Experiments 1 and 2 (spreads 
represent 95% confidence). 
 
For confidence judgments the main effect of response type and the interaction 
were significant. Post-hoc analysis showed participants were significantly more 
confident for correct congruent (M = 85.42%, SD = 8.37) than both correct (M = 
77.84%, SD = 9.12) and incorrect (M = 75.64%, SD = 10.51) incongruent responses. 
The difference between the two types of responses in the incongruent condition was 
also significant. Participants were more confident in Experiment 2 when compared 
to Experiment 1 only for correct congruent responses, but not for either of the 
response types in the incongruent condition. The mean values can be seen in Figure 
3. 
As mentioned in the Method section, it was correct to recognize the change as 
better when compared to the old/control option for half of the trials, and for half the 
trials it was correct to recognize it as worse. An additional analysis was conducted 
by introducing this control feature as an independent variable (new better/old better) 
which we will label as the novelty effect. The same analyses as the ones above were 
conducted with this additional effect. Two (response times and confidence) 
2(experiment) ×2(novelty) × 3(response type) ANOVAs were conducted. Results 
showed that all of the previously significant effects were the same and did not interact 
with the novelty effect. Interestingly, for confidence judgments the main effect of 
novelty was significant (F(1, 107) = 13.95, p < .01, ηp2 = .11). Participants were more 
confident in trials in which the change was the normatively better choice (M = 
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82.94%, SD = 8.62) than the old/control option (M = 81.25%, SD = 8.40). The effect 
was not significant for response times. 
 
 
Figure 3. Confidence judgments as a function of response type in Experiments 1 and 2 
(spreads represent 95% confidence). 
 
Analysis of Individual Differences 
 
Previous studies have shown there are significant individual differences in 
conflict sensitivity during reasoning (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Frey et al., 2018; 
Mevel et al., 2015). Similar to a recent study (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018) we 
decided to test for possible differences by forming two sub-groups of participants 
based on their accuracy in the incongruent condition. Mean accuracy in that 
condition across both experiments was 59.84% (with a median of 60%) so the 
median was chosen as the critical value. Participants with a lower accuracy were 
assigned to the low accuracy group (N = 49), while participants with 60% or higher 
accuracy were assigned to the high accuracy group (N = 60). Two 2(experiment) × 
2(accuracy group) × 3(response type) ANOVAs were conducted for response times 
and confidence judgments. Response times analysis revealed (alongside previously 
determined effects) a main effect of accuracy group (F(1, 84) = 5.51, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.06) which showed participants in the higher accuracy group were generally slower. 
However, the key finding was a significant accuracy group by response type 
interaction (F(2, 168) = 14.69, p < .01, ηp2 = .15) which can be seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Response times as a function of response type and accuracy group (spreads 
represent 95% confidence). 
 
Post-hoc analysis of the interaction showed the high accuracy group was 
significantly slower when compared to the low accuracy group only when 
responding incorrectly in the incongruent condition, but differences in the remaining 
two response types were not significant. It is worth noting that the accuracy group 
by response type effect was the same for both experiments, and that no other 
interactions were significant. 
The same analysis of confidence judgments revealed a significant accuracy 
group by response type interaction (F(2, 168) = 12.11, p < .01, ηp2 = .13) which can 
be seen in Figure 5. Post-hoc analysis showed participants in the high accuracy 
group, in comparison with the low accuracy group, were significantly more confident 
when providing correct responses in the incongruent condition. The differences were 
not significant for the other two response types, but it is worth noting that the 
direction of the difference between the two groups was reversed for incorrect 
responses in the incongruent condition. As was the case for response times, the 
accuracy group effect interacted only with response type and the pattern of results 
was the same in both experiments. 
 




Figure 5. Confidence judgments as a function of response type and accuracy group (spreads 





The goal of this study was to modify the covariation detection task in order to 
investigate the magnitude-versus-ratio bias within the meta-reasoning framework, 
which is the first study of this kind, as far as we know. This task has been used to 
provide insight into what is described as scientific reasoning which involves testing 
hypotheses, evaluating results, covariation and causation (Stanovich, 2009b; 
Stanovich et al., 2016). In general, the two independent experiments revealed a 
strong effect of conflict on all three of the dependent variables. Participants were 
more accurate, faster and more confident when the frequency and ratio information 
were congruent (point towards the same response). Experiment 2 successfully 
replicated the effect of congruence and revealed a significant effect of ratio extremity 
on response times and confidence judgments. Participants from Experiment 2 were, 
generally speaking, faster and more confident than participants from Experiment 1. 
We also expected ratio extremity to increase accuracy in Experiment 2 when 
compared to Experiment 1. The data shows an increase of accuracy in both congruent 
and incongruent conditions in Experiment 2, however, the difference was not 
statistically significant. From the general analysis, we can conclude that the main 
experimental manipulation of congruence was successful and had a very similar 
effect as in other reasoning tasks. When conflict is successfully detected in 
incongruent trials, additional processing is required to resolve the conflict. This 
additional processing prolongs response times. Conflict also leads to lower levels of 
confidence which other studies have shown to be both a direct and mediated effect. 
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Some results show that the detection of conflict lowers confidence levels even when 
there is no significant impact on response times (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018), on 
the other hand, there is an indirect effect of conflict on confidence due to the well 
documented relationship between fluency and metacognitive judgments (Ackerman 
& Zalmanov, 2012; Thompson, Evans et al., 2013; Thompson, Prowse Turner et al., 
2013). Conflict resolution prolongs response times which are negatively correlated 
with confidence judgments. Due to the low proportions of correct responses in 
previous studies with the covariation detection task (Toplak et al., 2011; West, 
Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008; Stanovich & West, 1998b), we speculated that the bias 
towards larger numbers would be the dominant Type 1 process. However, in 
previous studies, the task was significantly different from our modification in two 
important ways. First, belief bias was present, and in some cases, represented the 
main source of bias (Stanovich & West, 1998b; Sa et al., 1999; West et al., 2008) 
without known interactions with the bias towards larger numbers. Second, 
participants were instructed to respond in terms of a perceived positive or negative 
relationship between the treatment and the positive outcomes. Our study showed that, 
when controlling for other effects, accuracy in incongruent conditions proves to be 
quite high (around 60%). This would indicate that the two processes which generate 
the ratio and frequency based responses are closer in strength than expected. It is 
quite plausible that in this format, the ratio information generated the more dominant 
response. If this were the case, we would expect the proportion of successful conflict 
detections in Experiment 2 to be lower than in Experiment 1, leading to more 
accurate, faster and more confident responses in incongruent trials. While this was 
generally true, the non-significant difference in confidence represents a deviation 
from those expectations.  
Since simple effects do not provide enough detailed information in these types 
of studies, it is important to analyse data based on response type. Correct responses 
in the congruent condition are used as a baseline. These responses should result in 
highest accuracy rates, shortest response times and highest confidence levels since 
both the heuristic and normative processing cue the same option. In order to truly test 
for the effect of conflict and its detection on meta-reasoning, it is important to 
compare the correct congruent responses to both correct and biased responses in the 
incongruent condition. For example, if there were no difference between the correct 
congruent and biased incongruent responses, then it would be difficult to argue that 
the participants are sensitive to conflict regardless of the response they make in the 
incongruent condition. Studies within the reasoning and meta-reasoning framework 
have shown that people are indeed sensitive to conflict even in the presence of strong 
biases (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Pennycook et al., 
2015; Thompson & Johnson, 2014). If the two processes which generated the 
responses in our version of the task were closer in strength than is usually the case in 
reasoning research, we would expect a clear effect of conflict regardless of response 
type in the incongruent condition. The results proved this expectation to be correct. 
Participants were slower and less confident for both correct and incorrect responses 
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in the incongruent condition when compared to the congruent condition, and this was 
true in both experiments. Additionally, participants were more confident when 
giving correct responses in incongruent trials while the difference in response times 
was not significant. These results provide an additional argument towards the 
speculated dominance of ratio versus frequency information in this format of the task. 
If the ratio information is relatively stronger, then cognitive decoupling of that 
response, and towards the frequency-based response, should have a greater impact 
than vice versa. This would explain the observed differences in confidence levels 
between the correct and incorrect responses in the incongruent condition. The 
significant difference in confidence and non-significant difference in response times 
also provide evidence towards an independent effect of conflict detection and 
resolution on metacognitive judgments, beyond the fluency-metacognition 
relationship.  
Closer observation of the data revealed that participants in Experiment 2 were 
faster when giving correct responses in congruent and incongruent trials when 
compared to participants in Experiment 1, but not when giving incorrect responses 
in incongruent trials. The more interesting analysis of confidence judgments revealed 
an interaction effect between ratio extremity and response type. Confidence was 
significantly higher in Experiment 2 for correct congruent responses but not for either 
correct or incorrect responses in the incongruent condition. We expected that in 
Experiment 2 confidence would be higher for correct, but lower for incorrect 
responses in the incongruent condition when compared to Experiment 1. This was 
expected because the information in favour of the correct response was stronger in 
Experiment 2, and conversely, the arguments for incorrect responses were weaker, 
relatively speaking. However, the only significant difference in confidence between 
the two experiments was observed for correct congruent responses, in favour of 
Experiment 2. This would indicate that the drop in confidence for incongruent trials 
is mainly determined by the fact that conflict was detected and by the outcome of the 
resolution of that conflict (response type). The increased strength of the ratio 
information in Experiment 2 did not lead to a more extreme drop in confidence for 
incorrect responses or to a mitigated drop for correct responses in the incongruent 
condition. Considering sample size and type of measurement, there is a possibility 
that the manipulation was not extreme enough to reveal the effect. Another 
possibility is that the increased ratio extremity influences the probability of conflict 
detection but has a limited impact after successful detection. 
Since the complicated task of drawing conclusions about processes within meta-
reasoning is made even more complicated by findings of significant individual 
differences in both conflict sensitivity (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; Frey et al., 2018; 
Mevel et al., 2015) and cognitive styles (Stanovich et al., 2016; Stanovich & West, 
1998a; West et al., 2008), it is necessary to incorporate them into meta-reasoning 
experiments even when those differences are not the focus of the study. In a previous 
study (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018), we demonstrated a successful method of 
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differentiating between conflict sensitive and conflict insensitive participants based 
on their accuracy in incongruent trials. For this study, participants were grouped 
based on median accuracy in the incongruent trials (C = 60%) into a low and high 
accuracy group. Response time and confidence data analysis based on response type 
and accuracy group revealed, perhaps, the most interesting findings of the study. 
Results showed participants in the high accuracy group were slower and less 
confident for incorrect responses when compared to correct ones in the incongruent 
condition. On the other hand, participants in the low accuracy group were faster and 
more confident for incorrect when compared to correct responses in the incongruent 
condition. This finding indicates that the dominance pattern of the processes which 
generate the two types of responses is not the same for these two groups of 
participants. In the high accuracy group, the ratio carried more weight relative to the 
magnitude information. Conversely, in the low accuracy group, the pattern was 
reversed. The result has two very important implications in light of recent 
developments within the dual-process approach to reasoning as well as for the 
relationship between reasoning and metacognitive processes. First, previous studies 
have shown a trend which would indicate that cognitive decoupling is slower and 
leads to lower confidence relative to rationalization (Dujmović & Valerjev, 2018; 
Pennycook et al., 2015). Our results reveal a significant effect, but this was achieved 
only because the participants were differentiated into two accuracy groups. For both 
groups, the decoupling process prolonged response times and lowered confidence 
levels when compared to rationalization. Second, responses which would 
traditionally be attributed to purely analytical thinking may, for some participants, 
reflect processing similar to heuristic reasoning based on experience, automatization 
and other factors. This provides strong validation for the new hybrid models of dual-
processing which propose the existence of multiple Type 1 processes, including 
processing traditionally attributed to Type 2 systems. 
The interesting result labelled as the novelty effect provides material for the 
final discussion topic of this study. Results showed a slight systematic increase of 
confidence for trials in which the novel treatment/product/process was normatively 
the correct response when compared to trials in which the old treatment/ 
product/process was the correct response. The current study does not provide enough 
statistical power to detect subtle interactions which include the novelty effect but 
may prove interesting for a different study. We assume that the effect may be a 
specific type of belief bias. It may be the case that people expect changes and 
introductions of new treatments/products/processes to be more efficient when 
compared to current ones. This would easily be explained by the very nature of 
technological and societal development. Even when a product fulfils its purpose to a 
satisfactory degree, changes commonly lead to optimisation and new functions. This 
everyday experience may have led to the formation of such a specific, though slight, 
form of belief bias. 
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While the study mostly confirmed expectations, the noticeable absence of 
certain effects and interactions when trends do exist can be attributed to 
methodological issues. First, there was no pre-study to determine whether the 
scenarios were balanced and completely devoid of prior belief bias which could have 
interacted with the main experimental manipulations on some but not all trials. 
Second, there were only ten trials per experimental condition which in turn probably 
lead to lower power to detect differences between the two experiments, and 
especially when analysing differences depending on response type. Additional 
experimental control and an expanded set, as well as a larger sample, would be 
recommended for further use of the task with the same paradigm as developed in this 
study. 
To summarize, the current study provided strong evidence for the effect of 
conflict on response times and metacognitive judgments in a modified covariation 
detection task which tests aspects of scientific reasoning. The main experimental 
manipulation exploited a known bias towards magnitudes in probabilistic reasoning 
to induce conflict, which in turn lowered accuracy, prolonged responses and lowered 
confidence when compared to a congruent version of the task. Furthermore, cross-
experimental analyses revealed that increasing the ratio extremity led to faster 
responses for correct congruent and correct incongruent responses, and higher 
confidence only for correct congruent responses. Finally, findings show that there 
are large individual differences in the relative strength of the Type 1 processes which 
generated responses in the task. When these differences are included into the 
statistical analysis, a strong pattern of results show that cognitive decoupling has a 
greater impact on both response times and metacognitive judgments relative to 
rationalization. The modified covariation detection task may prove to be a valuable 
tool for meta-reasoning research in the future since it allows manipulations of 
multiple factors which influence reasoning processes. Scientific reasoning represents 
everyday thinking and reasoning to a higher degree, compared to other, more 
artificial, aspects and tasks within reasoning research. For this reason, it should be 
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The frequencies for positive and negative outcomes in each scenario were assigned by 
adhering to the following algorithm: 
1. The correct option had to have a 3 to 1 ratio of positive when compared to negative 
outcomes, while the incorrect option had to have a 2 to 1 ratio of positive to negative 
outcomes. 
2. To ensure the participants would not encounter the exact same ratios and 
frequencies, twenty random ratios ranging from 2.8-3.3 to 1 (with an average of 3 to 
1), and twenty ratios ranging from 1.8-2.1 to 1 (with an average of 2 to 1) were 
generated. 
3. Twenty random frequencies ranging from 200 to 300, and twenty ranging from 80 
to 100 were generated. 
4. The frequencies and ratios were distributed at random to generate twenty sets of four 
numbers. 
5. Ten of those sets were, at random, assigned to congruent, and ten to incongruent 
trials. 
6. For congruent trials, the higher ratio and higher frequency were used to generate the 
accompanying frequency of negative outcomes for the correct option (for example, 
a 2.9 to 1 ratio and a frequency of 256 positive outcomes produced a frequency of 
88) - the smaller ratios and smaller frequency were used to generate the frequency 
of negative outcomes for the incorrect option. 
7. For incongruent trials, the higher ratio and smaller frequency were used to generate 
the frequency of negative outcomes in the correct option while the lower ratio and 
higher frequency were used to generate the frequency of negative outcomes for the 
incorrect option. 
  
